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New CAP reform: changes and 
prospects under the new MFF 
deal 2014-2020  
BY MIKLÓS SOMAI* 
January 2014 marks the launch of the new seven-
year Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) of the 
EU. One of the most important changes compared 
to the previous (2007-2013) MFF will be the re-
designed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This 
article summarises the new features of the CAP.  
 
The reform of the CAP was formally adopted first 
by the European Parliament (EP) in November and 
then by the Council of Agriculture Ministers in De-
cember 2013. Some delegated and implemented 
acts remain to be worked out by the Commission 
and have to be sent to the Council and the EP for 
admission until mid-March 2014, in order that all 
regulations may be voted on before the election of 
the new EP.  
 
The process itself started in early 2010 with a wide-
ranging public debate on the basis of the Commis-
sion’s paper ‘The CAP towards 2020’, presented in 
November 2010. With this paper, indicating direc-
tions and options for the future CAP, and so being 
a sort of precursor to the legal proposals, the 
Commission initiated a second, this time narrower, 
professional-type debate with other involved institu-
tions and the stakeholders.  
 
The period between the publishing of the Commis-
sion’s legal proposals in October 2011 and the 
political agreement on the CAP in June 2013 was 
characterised by ever intensifying negotiations. 
According to its role of co-legislator, bolstered as 
such by the Lisbon Treaty, the EP put forward 
more than eight thousand amendments to the pro-
posals. Although a political agreement had been 
found on most details of the CAP reform package 
in June 2013, representatives of the three main 
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institutions had to go back to the negotiating table 
in September in order to finalise the reform as a 
whole. The reason behind this was that some key 
issues of the reform (capping, degressivity, external 
convergence, transfers between pillars, co-
financing rates for rural development, etc.), which 
were linked to the comprehensive MFF talks, had 
remained unsettled after the June agreement.  
 
The CAP reform and the overall MFF deal have 
been closely linked together throughout the negoti-
ations. Consequently, when evaluating whether the 
new Member States (NMS) of the EU are losers or 
winners of the new CAP, it is important to place the 
problem in the broader context of the MFF pack-
age. In this respect, it is interesting to discover that 
in terms of commitment appropriations, the new 
MFF makes real cuts only for those headings (agri-
cultural and cohesion policies) where the NMS 
have traditionally been more successful in obtain-
ing Community assistance. And on the contrary it is 
also true that funds grow most under those head-
ings (competitiveness) and sub-headings (re-
search) where the starting position of the NMS to 
draw on EU funds is less favourable compared to 
that of the highly developed Member States.  
 
In the new MFF the CAP (practically heading 2, 
‘Natural resources’) suffered a cut of 11.3% com-
pared to the previous MFF. The share of the NMS 
in the allocation of the average annual CAP was 
15.6% in the period 2007-2012, with a clearly as-
cending trend, rising from a level of 11.6% in 2007 
to 22.0% in 2012. As for ‘Market-related expendi-
ture and direct aids’, making up 78% of the CAP 
budget and cut back by 17.5% in the new MFF, the 
NMS average share was 11.5%, with an ascending 
trend going from 6.1% in 2007 to 16.6% in 2012. 
Naturally, these upward trends came from the 
phasing-in character of agricultural support for the 
NMS from the EU budget.  
 
Based on the Commission proposals of October 
2011, the agreement on the new CAP relates to 
five important EP/Council regulations: on direct 
payments; the single common market organisation; 
rural development; and a horizontal regulation for 
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financing, managing and monitoring the CAP. The 
fifth regulation defines the transitional rules for the 
year 2014 as, for technical reasons, the direct 
payments regulation shall only apply from 1
st
 Janu-
ary 2015.  
 
As direct payments (DP) make up about 70% of the 
CAP budget, at times of bargaining they are always 
in the centre of attention. With the enlargement in 
2004 and 2007 differences in the level of per hec-
tare DPs across the Member States became larger. 
Differences in per hectare support became a sub-
ject of constant complaining by the NMS, especially 
the three Baltic States and Romania and Bulgaria. 
The new CAP, while cutting back DPs in general, 
allocates relatively more support for those Member 
States where per hectare payment is below 90% of 
the EU average. It also guarantees a minimum 
level of EUR 196 per hectare support to be 
reached by 2019. These changes are to be fi-
nanced by Member States with above EU average 
DP per hectare, as the total sum of support de-
clines. Thus one of the main novelties of the new 
CAP is a modest redistribution of the direct pay-
ments across (and also within) the Member States, 
a phenomenon called external (and internal) con-
vergence. 
 
As for how the external convergence impacts on 
the NMS, we have to take into account that DP will 
be on strict diet in the next MFF; that the EU-27 will 
have to finance DP for Croatia; and that external 
convergence will have to be financed by members 
with above EU average DP (thus also by Slovenia 
among the NMS). If we compare average DP of the 
period 2015-2020 to those of 2013 (see bars in the 
middle in Figure 1) or the DP of the end year of the 
current and the next MFF (see right-side bars in 
Figure 1), it is clear that in real terms for most of 
the NMS DP will decrease rather than increase. 
Only the Baltic States (especially Latvia and Esto-
nia) can get access to substantially more support 
than in the previous period. The small increase 
incurred by Romania and Bulgaria is only due to 
the overlapping of their phasing-in period for the  
CAP overarching two MFFs. After all, only 
2.5-3.5% of the DP will be transferred from the old 
to the new Member States.  
 
Another aspect of the DP regime is related to the 
fact that with the exception of Slovenia and Malta 
all other NMS apply the simplified Single Area 
Payment Scheme (SAPS), a flat rate payment per 
hectare at MS level. Originally the SAPS was es-
tablished for a transitional period of five years. 
However, following the reform of 2008 (the so-
called ‘Health Check’) its application had been 
extended until 2013, and now the new CAP deal 
changed the end-date to 2020.  
 
Meanwhile in the old Member States the Single 
Payment Scheme (SPS) has been in use since the 
2003 reform. The calculation of the SPS varies 
from one MS to another and, depending on the 
model chosen, reflects past performances at indi-
vidual or regional level. As a differentiation like that 
is impossible within the SAPS, those differences in 
average per hectare DP between the old and the 
new Member States which, despite the above-
described external convergence, will remain con-
siderable, may show even higher differences at 
farm gate level. The so-called internal convergence 
introduced in the new CAP may, however, be con-
sidered as a first step in the right direction as it 
pushes Member States with historical references to 
move towards a fairer and more converging per 
hectare payment at national or regional level.  
 
A third important feature of the new CAP relates to 
the fact that the post-2013 Common Agricultural 
Policy will be anything but common. Though there 
will be a common framework of agricultural policy, 
in practice 28 different agricultural policies will be 
implemented. This is due to the new regulation that 
makes the whole system largely flexible and ren-
ders several of its main elements optional. Some 
examples: the share of ‘coupled’ payments, i.e. 
linked to a specific product, which at the end of 
2013 was 6%, may reach as much as 15% of the 
national envelope, and the Commission may ap-
prove an even higher rate where justified; in case  
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Figure 1 
Evolution of direct payments in real terms (2011 prices) under the new MFF deal  
compared with the old one 
 
Source: European Commission, EU expenditure and revenue, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm ;  
Eurostat, HICP inflation rate, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&tableSelection=1&labeling=labels&footnotes=yes&language=en&pcode=tec00118&plu
gin=1 
N.B.: All data referred to in this article are calculated in 2011 prices.  
 
of general market disturbances the Commission 
will, for all sectors, be authorised to take emergen-
cy measures. Further flexibilities and options in-
volve the possibility to redistribute payments for the 
first 30 hectares of the farms and/or towards small 
farmers and/or towards farms situated in less fa-
voured areas and in areas with natural constraints. 
Finally, there is the possibility of transferring quite 
important shares (i.e. up to 15-25%) of funds be-
tween the two pillars of the CAP (i.e. between di-
rect payments and the rural development enve-
lope). Considering the enlarged set of policy in-
struments available under the new CAP, as well as 
its ‘à la carte’ character, for the smaller, i.e. for 
most of the NMS, it will be better not to be in a 
hurry to elaborate their own policy mix; instead, 
they better wait for their biggest intra-EU export 
markets (Germany in most of the cases) to decide 
first. A hasty step might seriously disadvantage 
important players in one or more sectors in the 
agri-food chain of a small NMS. 
 
As for some special issues where the NMS could 
have easily been on the loser side (e.g. capping 
and greening) we must note that the Commission’s 
original proposals were considerably watered 
down, so that no big harm will occur. Instead of 
introducing a compulsory capping – which would 
have been progressive for farms with DP more 
than EUR 150 thousand a year and confiscating 
above EUR 300 thousand – there will only be a 
compulsory ‘degressivity’ and a voluntary ‘capping’. 
This, in practice, will take away at least 5% of the 
DP above EUR 150 thousand (greening not includ-
ed and salary costs deducted), which is good news 
for the biggest farms vis-à-vis the originally envis-
aged ‘confiscatory’ capping. As for the greening, 
two of its three basic practices (crop  
  
96.8% 93.2% 93.0%
104.6%
95.3%
116.9%
110.0%
155.8%
93.5%
135.6%
93.6%
88.6% 88.4%
108.6%
92.7%
126.8%
110.3%
191.6%
87.4%
157.2%
0.0%
50.0%
100.0%
150.0%
200.0%
250.0%
300.0%
PL HU CZ RO SK LT BG LV SI EE
annual average 2015-2020/annual average 2007-2012 annual average 2015-2020/full right DP (2013) DP 2020/full right DP (2013)
T H E  R E F O R M E D  C A P  A N D  T H E  N M S  
 
The Vienna Institute Monthly Report 2014/1 15 
 
diversification and ecological focus area) will only 
be applied above a certain farm size, which is good 
news for the very small farms. Due to dual farm 
structures in some of the NMS – an enduring herit-
age of the past – very big and very small farms are 
of quite an importance. So, all changes affecting 
their incomes or costs pose important challenges at 
the political level. 
Conclusions 
In Europe, the profitability of farming activity de-
pends a lot on public subsidies. In this respect, a 
part of the NMS competitiveness was determined 
by their accession treaties which did not allow 
these countries to apply for CAP subsidies on the 
basis of their past performances dating back to the 
late 1980s, i.e. according to the regulation which 
was in force for the old Member States at that time. 
This sort of discrimination, which went entirely 
against the logic of the single market, has been 
somewhat mitigated since then, and will be further 
alleviated under the new CAP regime. But the left-
over of this handicap, together with the important 
technological backwardness, will continue to un-
dermine the competitiveness of the agricultural 
operators of the NMS (especially in the animal 
sectors).  
 
Although the new CAP contains a lot of measures 
which are designed to fight these tendencies, it is 
to be feared that negative features of agriculture in 
the NMS, such as the concentration and the exten-
sification in arable land systems, as well as stagna-
tion/depletion in livestock numbers, will persist. 
 
 
